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Abstract: 
To what extent citizens are willing not only to support ambitious climate policy, but also 
willing to pay for such policy remains subject to debate. Our analysis addresses three issues 
in this regard: whether, as is widely assumed but not empirically established, willingness to 
support (WTS) is higher than willingness to pay (WTP); whether the determinants of the two 
are similar; and what accounts for within-subject similarity between WTS and WTP. We 
address these issues based on data from an original nationally representative survey 
(N=2500) on forest conservation in Brazil, arguably the key climate policy issue in the 
country. The findings reveal that WTP is much lower than WTS. The determinants differ to 
some extent as well; regarding the effects of age, gender, and trust in government. The 
analysis also provides insights into factors influencing how much WTS and WTP line up 
within individuals, with respect to age, education, political ideology, salience of the 
deforestation issue, and trust in government. Our findings provide a more nuanced picture of 
how strong public support for climate change policy is, and a starting point for more targeted 
climate policy communication. 
 
Keywords: Climate change mitigation, willingness to support, willingness to pay, forest 
conservation, survey, Brazil 
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1.0 Introduction 
Climate change mitigation has important implications for citizens, because, for example, it 
imposes behavioral restrictions and affects energy costs as well as the allocation of public 
spending (Kane and Shogren 2000; Grothmann and Patt 2005). Though cost estimates 
concerning climate policy are plagued by high degrees of uncertainty, such policy is bound to 
impose substantial opportunity costs on individuals and societies as a whole (Victor and 
House 2005; Stern et al. 2006; McCollum et al. 2013; Nordhaus 2015). Particularly in 
democratic countries, policy-makers are thus – and, from a normative democratic standpoint, 
should be – affected in their climate policy decisions by what citizens want (Drews and 
Bergh 2015).  
 Public opinion surveys have sought to measure the “public will” in this respect, and to 
identify determinants of variation in country-level and individual attitudes and preferences 
(e.g., Scruggs and Benegal 2012; Harring and Jagers 2013; Geels, 2013; Wiseman et al. 
2013; Kachi et al. 2015). Many of these studies have gauged, based on surveys and survey 
experiments, people’s concern about climate change and their support or opposition to 
climate change mitigation, in a general sense, or with respect to specific mitigation measures 
(e.g., Ryan and Spash 2011; Vincent et al. 2014). According to a recent survey by PEW 
(2015), for instance, 54% in all 40 countries polled (average across the 40 countries) consider 
climate change a very serious problem. 78% on average want their country to limit 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.  
 Survey embedded experiments show, however, that when people are confronted with 
cost implications of mitigation policy they become less supportive (e.g., Gampfer et al 2014; 
Bechtel and Scheve 2015). This suggests that differences in survey design and item wording 
matter, and that we should pay greater attention to differences between willingness to support 
(WTS) climate mitigation policy and willingness to pay (WTP) for such policy. The existing 
literature focuses to a large degree on WTS measures, and there are fewer studies that 
examine WTP for climate mitigation (e.g., Carlsson and Martinsson 2001; Turpie 2003; 
Brouwer et al. 2008; Solomon and Johnson 2009; Diederich and Goeschl 2014). 
 The existing evidence suggests that WTS survey instruments are likely to produce 
higher scores than WTP instruments (e.g., Seip and Strand 1992). However, to the best of our 
knowledge, this has not yet been systematically examined, though some studies on climate 
policy use WTP measurements and a few studies use both WTS and WTP approaches. In 
depth analysis of differences between WTS and WTP can provide several insights. First, it 
can offer a more nuanced picture of constraints public opinion may impose on climate policy-
making, relative to focusing on WTS alone. It may, for instance, help in highlighting 
differences in public support levels associated with more or less manifest cost implications. 
Second, it allows us to examine whether determinants of WTS and WTP are similar. Third, it 
can generate information on what types of citizens are more likely to be what we will call 
“non-green” (both low WTS and WTP), “deep green” (both high WTS and WTP), “shallow 
green” (high WTS but low WTP), or “paradox green” (low WTS but high WTP, paradox 
because the presumption is that WTS is generally higher than WTP). 
 We address these questions based on data from an original nationally representative 
survey in Brazil (N=2500) that was implemented between late 2015 and early 2016. This 
survey focused on climate change mitigation and forest conservation, which is the most 
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important and publicly salient climate policy issue in Brazil. Our survey included a range of 
WTS and WTP items as well as items on potential determinants of variation in individual 
level WTS and WTP.  
 
2.0 Conceptual differences between WTS and WTP  
Most research on climate policy preferences focuses on people’s general support for (or 
opposition to) climate policy. For example, a 2010 World Bank survey asks: “As you may 
know, [participant’s country] and other countries from around the world will be meeting in 
December in Copenhagen to develop a new agreement to take steps against climate change 
by limiting greenhouse gas emissions. If the other countries come to an agreement, do you 
think [participant’s country] should or should not be willing to commit to limiting its 
greenhouse gas emissions as part of such an agreement?” Factors that are used to explain 
preferences, captured in such form, include for instance socio-demographic variables, risk 
perceptions, general world-views, trust in public institutions, political ideology, and self-
efficacy (e.g., Tobler et al. 2012; Geels 2013; Wiseman et al. 2013; Drews and Bergh 2015).  
 Other research has examined WTP (e.g., Inglehart 1995; Jacobsen and Hanley 2009; 
Lindhjem and Tuan 2012; Krosnick and MacInnis 2013; Diederich and Goeschl 2014). In 
general, we see two basic approaches of measuring WTP: revealed preferences and stated 
preferences. The first approach examines individuals’ behavior in order to capture their 
(revealed) preferences towards climate change mitigation (e.g., Jaccard et al. 2003; Bürer and 
Wüstenhagen 2009; Diederich and Goeschl 2014). The second approach asks participants to 
choose from hypothetical choice sets. The stated-preferences approach is categorized further 
according to the type of valuation question, e.g., dichotomous choice using bid amounts (e.g., 
Cameron 2005; Brouwer et al. 2008), payment cards (e.g., Solomon and Johnson 2009), or 
open-ended questions (e.g., Kotchen et al. 2013). For instance, Aldy et al. (2012) employ 
different randomized amounts to ask survey participants how much they think a national 
clean energy standard (NCES) would increase their annual household electricity bill. To this 
end, they offer “bid” amounts between $5 and $155. They find that a $10 increase in the 
annual household cost of the NCES decreases the probability of policy support by 1 
percentage point. Likewise, Kotchen et al. (2013) conclude that “US households are, on 
average, willing to pay between $79 and $89 per year in support of reducing domestic 
greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions 17% by 2020. Even very conservative estimates yield an 
average WTP at or above $60 per year.” Other studies expose survey participants to climate 
policy proposals, and let them express their preferences vis-à-vis such proposals. Such choice 
experiments can provide information on what role cost implications play, relative to other 
policy attributes. They find that support for climate policies tends to decline with increasing 
costs. Similarly, framing experiments that randomly embed references to costs in survey 
items gauging climate policy references show that support for climate policy declines to some 
extent when costs are referred to (Gampfer et al. 2014; Bechtel and Scheve 2015; Bernauer 
and McGrath 2016).  
 Whereas most of the existing research employs either a WTS or a WTP approach, we 
are interested in comparing the two. There is considerable disagreement in the 
environmental-economics literature on the extent to whether the two concepts can be used 
interchangeably. Randall and Stoll (1980), for instance, argue that WTP and WTS do not 
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differ much unless there are significant income effects (Breffle et al. 2015). However, WTS 
refers to the general support for climate change policy, while WTP refers to people’s 
intention to pay for climate change mitigation. We thus expect WTP and WTS levels to be 
shaped by somewhat different considerations, which are likely to result in higher WTS than 
WTP levels. The principal consideration is that supporting a policy constitutes a less costly 
action for the respondent than paying for a policy (Diekmann and Preisendörfer 2003). 
Although our WTP measures in the survey are not set up to make participants pay directly, 
they generate an idea or feeling of the policy at stake having costly implications. Taking these 
arguments further, we then examine what types of individuals score similarly at low or high 
levels on the two measures, and which ones differ. We thus attempt to categorize people 
along their WTP and WTS levels to examine how potential driving factors impact on these 
outcome measures and differences across them. For example, the existing literature argues 
that left political ideology is associated with more favorable attitudes towards climate policy 
(Harring and Jagers 2013). But it remains unclear whether this results in higher WTS, WTP, 
or both. 
   
3.0 Study Design 
The following analysis relies on data from an original nationally representative survey fielded 
in Brazil between December 28, 2015 and January 12, 2016. We focused on Brazil because 
of an interest in forest conservation issues related to climate policy, and because of Brazil’s 
relevance to global climate change mitigation (Brechin 2003; Gebara et al. 2014). The survey 
was designed by the authors and was implemented by YouGov and its local partner in Brazil, 
Netquest. Details on the sampling strategy can be found in supplementary information SI-1.  
 The survey included in random order items on WTS and WTP for forest conservation 
and climate policy more generally. With regards to WTP, we acknowledge that the existing 
literature has employed different approaches in examining stated preferences. The first 
approach gauges WTP in a rather broad sense (e.g., Krosnick and MacInnis 2013), whereas 
the second approach results in monetized measurement units (e.g., Kotchen et al. 2013). 
Which of these two approaches is more useful for measuring WTP depends, in our view, on 
the objective of a given research effort. For the purposes of our study, we follow the first 
approach. The main reason is that we are interested in comparing WTS and WTP measures 
and thus prefer to use a similar measurement approach, in the sense of asking survey 
participants to respond to batteries of survey items, some of which pertain to whether they are 
willing to support climate mitigation policy, and others that pertain to whether they are 
willing to pay for such policy. Also, we included a range of socio-demographic and other 
items (See SI-2-SI-5).  
 
4.0 Empirical analysis 
The analysis reported in this section is organized along the three questions outlined at the 
outset. First, we examine the extent to which the two measurements (WTS, WTP) generate 
different results, and whether, as presumed, WTP is lower than WTS. Second, we examine to 
what extent determinants of WTS and WTP are similar or different. Third, we look at what 
kinds of people score similarly high or low or different on the two variables. 
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4.1 Are people more willing to support than to pay? A comparison 
Our survey included batteries of items for WTS and WTP respectively. Table 1 shows the 
scores on these items in simplified, i.e., dichotomized form (the subsequent analysis will use 
the full information. For item wordings and illustrations, see SI-3 and SI-4). To measure 
WTS, we used items capturing concern regarding climate change and support for mitigation 
policy. To measure WTP, we included items that make participants aware of costs of forest 
conservation policies, and ask them about their willingness to pay for such policies.  
To facilitate overall comparison and analysis of determinants of WTS and WTP 
respectively, and also mitigate problems of measurement error, we aggregated the individual 
item scores into composite measures, based on confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). The eight 
WTS items and four WTP items listed in Table 1 were used to that end. We constructed a 
broad measure of WTS that consists of items referring not only to specific policies for 
climate change and forest conservation, but also to individuals’ concern about climate 
change. The WTP measure focuses on people’s willingness to pay additional taxes for forest 
conservation and financial contributions to environmental NGOs. We do not capture 
willingness to pay by directly asking people for money or observing their monetary 
contributions, but asking about their intention to pay for forest conservation. This approach 
differs from the WTS one, which does not imply or refer to any (direct) costs. The factor 
loadings indicate the relationship of each variable (item) to the underlying factor (WTS and 
WTP). The factor loadings for WTS range between 0.29 and 0.45. The factor loadings for 
WTP range from 0.50 to 0.64 (SI-6). The distribution of the WTS variable is significantly 
different from the distribution of the WTP variable. The mean for WTP equals 0.80 and the 
mean for WTS is 0.40. The standard deviation is 0.14 and 0.29 respectively (Table and 
Figure SI-3). Average WTP is much lower than average WTS, and WTP scores are much 
more heterogeneous (much higher standard deviation) than WTS scores. This finding thus 
responds to the first question, as outlined at the outset of the paper (to what extent the two 
measures differ). The fact that we observe such differences between the two measurements 
(i.e., WTS and WTP) raises questions about whether the determinants of WTS and WTP 
differ as well, and what types of people score similarly high or low or different on the two 
variables. 
 
4.2 Determinants of WTS and WTP 
To examine whether determinants differ across the two outcome variables of interest here we 
regress these two variables on a wide range of potential determinants that have been 
identified as relevant in prior research (e.g., Geels 2013; Wiseman et al. 2013; Drews and 
Bergh 2015). We include two demographic variables, gender and age. Gender is a dummy 
variable, 1 for male and 2 for female. Age is a count variable ranging from 18 to 78 years old. 
We also include in the analysis indicators for income, education, and political ideology. 
Income captures the annual household income of a survey participant and is measured in 
Brazilian Real. Education captures the highest level of education of a participant. The 
categories are: no schooling, elementary school, high school, professional training, 
undergraduate studies, and postgraduate studies. For political ideology, we coded dummy 
variables (left, center, right, uncertain) and use “uncertain” as the baseline category. 
Participants are likely to differ in their knowledge of environmental issues (Dolan et al. 
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2012). We thus asked participants a question on greenhouse gas emissions (knowledge). 
Also, we included an item that measures whether participants consider deforestation a crucial 
environmental issue in Brazil (deforestation salience). Finally, we employ a variable that 
measures trust in the Brazilian government (trust). Fairbrother (2016) finds that political trust 
is an important correlate of greater WTP, but not of environmental concern (for item 
wordings, see SI-5). 
In both models shown in Table 2, we regress WTS (Model 1) and WTP (Model 2) on 
a set of potential determinants. Model 1 shows that women and younger participants are on 
average more willing to pay for forest conservation. We also find that education and the 
salience of deforestation have a positive and significant effect on WTP. Turpie (2003), in a 
study on South Africa, found a positive correlation between WTP and income and 
knowledge. In another study, Bruderer et al. (2014) found a negative correlation between 
income and environmentally responsible behavior. In our study, knowledge and income have 
no significant effect on WTP. This finding could be driven by the current economic recession 
in Brazil, which is likely to make people more skeptical towards any environmental policy.  
Model 2 focuses on determinants of WTS. Unlike in Model 1 (WTP), gender is not a 
significant determinant, and age is a positive and significant predictor of WTS, meaning that 
older people are more supportive of climate change policy. Knowledge also turns out to be a 
significant and positive predictor of WTS. Our results regarding trust in the government are 
in line with previous findings; trust in government, while having a significant positive effect 
on WTP, has no significant effect on WTS (Fairbrother 2016) (see also Table SI-5). 
Education level, left political ideology, income, and deforestation salience all have similar 
effects on both outcome variables (positive, except for income, which does not have a 
significant effect across the models). Refer to the supplementary information SI-6 and SI-7 
for additional models and a series of robustness tests. 
 
4.3 Explaining similarities and differences between WTS and WTP scores 
The differences in what factors drive WTS and WTP, as described and explained in the previous 
section, point to a need for better understanding of what types of individuals score similarly at low 
or high levels on the two measurements, and which ones differ in what ways. To that end we 
divided survey participants into four groups, based on how their WTS and WTP scores compare.  
For a straightforward and intuitive analysis, we used the median values on the two 
variables to create four groups (Table SI-8). The median value of WTS is 0.83 and the median 
value of WTP is 0.39. 773 individuals were thus categorized as “non green”, based on low scores 
both on WTS and WTP. 532 individuals were categorized as “shallow green”, as they score high 
on WTS but low on WTP. 497 individuals were categorized as “paradox green”. We considered it 
less likely that an individual would be highly motivated to pay for climate policy whilst she/he 
does not support it. Note, however, that there might be some borderline cases, namely those who 
are very close to the median values. For example, there might be individuals with the highest WTS 
scores within the low WTS category and the lowest WTP within the high WTP category. Finally, 
“deep green” individuals, in our categorization, score high on both variables (N=698). We are, of 
course, aware that this categorization is very simple and uses somewhat provocative labels. Yet, 
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we think that this is a useful first attempt to explore how and why people may score similarly or 
differently on the WTS and WTP variable. 
To examine what types of people are more likely to be in which of the four categories we 
carried out multinomial regressions, with the four categories serving as classifications on the 
outcome variable to be explained (Table 3). The explanatory variables are those also used for 
comparison of determinants of WTS and WTP in the previous section (Table 2). The distributions 
of explanatory variables at the aggregate level and within each of the four categories are 
graphically shown in SI-7. 
The coefficients of multinomial logit models (Table 3) have to be interpreted with regards 
to a baseline (i.e., one value of the categorical dependent variable). For that purpose, we use the 
“non-green” category (low scores on both WTS and WTP). Coefficients in multinomial logit 
models, however, cannot be interpreted as slopes, and thus we provide marginal effects (Figure SI-
7). Overall, the results indicate that there are substantial differences across the explanatory 
variables with regards to their effects on the outcome. For example, individuals become 
economically more conservative with age (Binstock and Quadagno 2001; Goerres 2008). Our 
results show that age significantly increases (by 28 percentage points) the probability of an 
individual to be in the shallow-green category, and it is a significantly negative predictor for being 
in the paradox-green and deep-green categories. Moreover, women tend to be more concerned 
about climate change than men (see also McCright 2010). However, we also find that women are 
somewhat more likely (by 3.7 percentage points) to be in the paradox-green category.  
We expect that highly educated people are both more supportive and more willing to pay 
for climate policy. Less educated people, conversely, should be more likely to end up in the non-
green category. When increasing education from the minimum to the maximum and holding all 
other variables constant at their medians, the likelihood of being in the deep-green category in fact 
increases by 22 percentage points. The (perceived) salience of deforestation (i.e., whether 
participants consider deforestation a crucial environmental issue in Brazil) is a significantly 
positive predictor for the deep-green and the shallow-green categories. Individuals who consider 
deforestation a less salient issue are neither supportive nor willing to pay for forest conservation. In 
more substantive terms, when increasing perceived salience from the minimum to the maximum 
(i.e., not salient issue to very salient issue), the likelihood of belonging to the non-green group 
decreases by 35 percentage points. Conversely, the likelihood of belonging to the deep-green 
category increases by 27 percentage points.  
The most knowledgeable individuals belong to the strongest supporters of climate change 
policy (WTS) (Turpie 2003), but this does not mean that they are also willing to pay. When 
increasing knowledge from the minimum to the maximum, the likelihood of belonging to the 
deep-green category increases by 2.2 percentage points. The least knowledgeable individuals are 
those who do not support forest conservation policy, but are still willing to pay for them (“paradox 
green”) (see also Table SI-6). Existing studies find significant differences between different 
ideological groups and climate change policy in the United States (Nisbet et al. 2015). In our 
study, center and right political ideology do not have a strong significant impact on the dependent 
variable. We find, however, that left-wing individuals are less likely to belong to the non-green 
category. The results show that a left political viewpoint is associated with a 9-percentage point 
lower likelihood of belonging to the non-green category. 
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 Finally, trust is an important predictor of WTP. Individuals exhibiting high levels of trust 
in government are more willing to pay for forest conservation, even if they exhibit only weak 
support for forest conservation (paradox green). When increasing trust from the minimum to the 
maximum, the likelihood of belonging to the paradox-green category increases by 11 percentage 
points. Likewise, the likelihood of belonging to the deep-green category increases by 8.7 
percentage points. However, the chances of belonging to the shallow green category decrease by 
7.7 percentage points, while the likelihood of belonging to the non-green category decreases by 12 
percentage points. 
We also report χ2-test statistics and probabilities to assess whether the effects of the 
explanatory variables are identical across categories (Tables SI-9 and SI-10). Overall, we observe 
that age, education, left political ideology, salience of the climate change issue, and trust in 
government are the most important determinants that influence to what category an individual 
belongs to. These determinants are consistently and significantly positive. 
    
5.0 Discussion 
Particularly in democratic societies, public opinion acts as a constraint on or facilitator for 
what policy-makers can do (or avoid doing) in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and 
thus mitigate adverse consequences of climatic changes. Knowing what the public prefers is 
important for understanding what current climate policy looks like and where it might be 
heading, and for assessing how current policies compare to what citizens want. These 
considerations have led to a large and growing body of research on citizens’ attitudes and 
preferences with respect to climate change mitigation policy.  
 Preferences with respect to climate change mitigation policy are being measured 
primarily in terms of willingness to support (WTS) and willingness to pay (WTP). While cost 
considerations clearly do play a role when citizens form preferences with respect to 
mitigation policy, the existing evidence also shows that other factors matter too (e.g., 
Diekmann and Preisendörfer 2003; Bernauer and McGrath 2016). Hence, we believe that 
using both types of measures is the most insightful approach, both in policy and academic 
terms. This also means, however, that a clearer understanding is needed on how the two 
measures compare and relate.  
 In this paper, we thus engage in a systematic comparison of the two measurement 
approaches (i.e., WTS and WTP), examining the implications for identifying factors that 
shape public opinion on climate change policy, and also examine what kinds of citizens are 
likely to score similarly or differently with respect to WTS and WTP. The empirical analysis 
is based on new public opinion data from a representative sample from Brazil, which faces 
great challenges in conserving tropical forests and dealing with climate change more 
generally.  
 The results reveal substantial differences between WTS and WTP, with WTP turning 
out to be lower than WTS, as expected. The determinants of WTS and WTP differ to some 
degree as well, reaffirming that the two measures capture somewhat different facets of public 
preferences concerning climate policy. The analysis also provides further insights into how 
individuals group into different combinations of WTS and WTP. When studying these 
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groupings, we find that age, education, left political ideology, salience of deforestation, and 
trust in government have significant effects.  
 While the research presented here provides more nuanced insights into different facets 
of citizens’ climate policy preferences, it also has some limitations that could be addressed in 
further research. Like the large majority of studies on WTP for environmental policy, our 
measurement captures stated (or intended) rather than revealed or de facto willingness to pay. 
Additionally, in contrast to some other WTP measurements, our approach does not generate 
information on how much, in monetary terms, survey participants would pay for particular 
climate policies (e.g., defined in terms of the GHG emissions they would reduce). Rather, it 
captures WTP in a more general form. Further research could also measure WTP in direct 
terms, e.g., by using contingent valuation methods (see Diamond and Hausman 1994; 
Hanemann 1994), and compare the resulting measure to our broader WTP variable as well as 
WTS. Moreover, it would be useful to engage in field experiments, where WTP could be 
assessed in a more realistic fashion, e.g., in the form of donation campaigns supporting forest 
conservation. Further research could also look more closely into why certain types of 
individuals are more willing to support climate policy than to pay for it, and vice versa. 
Finally, another limitation is that the survey took place while Brazil experienced a major 
economic downturn. Future research could explore whether WTP is more sensitive to 
economic downturns than WTS. 
The main policy implication of our study is that decision-makers, when planning 
climate policies, should engage in systematic assessment of both WTS and WTP in order to 
understand constraints emanating from public support for (or opposition to) such policies. To 
the extent the determinants of WTS and WTP differ, or are similar at low or high scores, 
political communication could also be better tailored to specific subgroups. 
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Table 1. List of WTS and WTP questions and percentages of support 
Please tell us your opinion about the 
following statements: 
 
WTS 
 
1. We need to preserve rainforests in 
Brazil even if this means less land for 
agriculture or construction in Brazil. 
 
2. We need to preserve rainforests in 
Brazil, even if this means that the 
government of Brazil has to reduce 
government spending/investment in other 
areas. 
 
3. To limit climate change (global 
warming), do you think people in Brazil 
and other countries will have to change 
their lifestyles, […] or can new 
technology solve the climate change 
problem without requiring changes of 
lifestyles? 
 
4. Do you think climate change is 
harming people in Brazil now, […] or 
will never harm people in Brazil? 
 
5. How concerned are you, if at all, that 
climate change will harm you personally 
at some point in your lifetime? 
 
6. The government of Brazil has pledged 
to reduce the country's emissions of 
carbon dioxide (CO2), which contribute to 
climate change (global warming), […] To 
what extent do you personally support or 
oppose this policy? 
 
7. People hold different views on whether 
Brazil should increase its forest 
conservation efforts on its own, […] 
Brazil should increase its forest 
conservation efforts . . . 
 
8. People hold different views on whether 
Brazil should reduce its carbon dioxide 
(CO2) emissions on its own, or reduce its 
emissions only if other countries […] 
Brazil should reduce its carbon dioxide 
emissions . . . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
79.16% 
 
 
74.24% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
71.96% 
 
 
 
 
  
 
95.56% 
 
 
 
 
94.48% 
 
 
 
93.36% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 84.44% 
 
 
 
 
 
81.12% 
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WTP 
 
1. We need to preserve rainforests in 
Brazil, even if this means raising taxes in 
Brazil to fund forest conservation. 
 
2. Would you personally be willing or not 
be willing to pay an additional R$ 30 in 
taxes per month […] to invest more in 
forest conservation? 
 
3. Would you personally be willing or not 
be willing to contribute R$ 100 to a large 
private environmental organization to 
support forest conservation […] 
 
4. Would you personally be willing or not 
be willing to pay more for certain […] to 
protect forests in Brazil? 
 
 
 
39.08% 
 
 
 
37.68% 
 
 
 
 
29.52% 
 
 
 
68.44% 
 
                    Note: See SI-2 for detailed wordings. 
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Table 2. Determinants of WTP and WTS 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 WTP WTS 
   Gender 0.03** -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Age -0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Education 0.01**  0.02***  
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Left 0.06***  0.01*** 
 (0.02) (0.00) 
Center 0.02  -0.00 
 (0.02) (0.00) 
Right -0.02  -0.00 
 (0.02) (0.00) 
Income 0.00     0.00  
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Knowledge 0.00  0.02***  
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Deforestation 
salience 
0.04***  
(0.01) 
0.08*** 
(0.01) 
Trust 0.04*** 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
Constant 0.24*** 0.48*** 
 (0.05) (0.02) 
Obs. 2500 2500 
F-Test 0.00 0.00 
R2 0.04 0.11 
                                 Notes: OLS regression, standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 3. Determinants of WTS and WTP profiles 
Dependent variable (2) 
Shallow 
green 
(3) 
Paradox 
green 
 
(4) 
Deep 
green 
Gender 0.01 
(0.12) 
 
0.27** 
(0.12) 
 
0.10 
(0.12) 
 
Age 0.02*** 
(0.01) 
-0.02*** 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Education 0.13** 
(0.18) 
 
0.01 
(0.06) 
 
0.26*** 
(0.05) 
 
Left 0.47*** 
(0.03) 
 
0.37** 
(0.18) 
 
0.46*** 
(0.17) 
 
Center 0.01 
(0.15) 
 
0.24* 
(0.15) 
 
0.04 
(0.14) 
 
Right -0.16 
(0.21) 
 
-0.11 
(0.22) 
 
-0.09 
(0.19) 
 
Income 0.03 
(0.02) 
 
0.01 
(0.02) 
 
0.02 
(0.02) 
 
    Knowledge 0.27** 
(0.12) 
 
-0.04 
(0.11) 
 
0.18* 
(0.10) 
 
Deforestation salience 0.68*** 
(0.13) 
 
0.17* 
(0.10) 
 
1.08*** 
(0.16) 
 
Trust 0.01 
(0.06) 
 
0.31*** 
(0.07) 
 
0.24*** 
(0.06) 
 
Constant -3.70*** -1.35*** -4.77*** 
 (0.54) (0.47) (0.58) 
Obs.   2,500 
Pseudo Log 
Likelihood 
  -3301.389 
Prob> χ 2   0.000 
 Notes: Multinomial logit: standard errors in parentheses;  
                         * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Baseline category is Non green = 1 
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Supplementary Information 
 
This part provides details on: 
 
1. SI-1 Survey sampling strategy. 
2. SI-2 Socio demographic characteristics of our sample. 
3. SI-3 Item wordings of willingness to support climate policies. 
4. SI-4 Item wordings of willingness to pay climate policies. 
5. SI-5 Item wordings of Control variables. 
6. SI-6 Comparison between WTP and WTS.	
7. SI-7 Explanatory variables. 
8. SI-8 Green categories 
9. SI-9 Significant Differences across categories. 
	
 
 
SI-1 Survey sampling strategy 
 
3,223 Brazilian residents were interviewed online. Based on propensity score matching, they 
were then fitted to a sample of 2,500 to produce the final dataset. YouGov then raked to 
marginals (i.e., carried out a sample balancing) for gender, age, and education. The frame was 
constructed by stratified sampling from the full 2014 Americas Barometer from the LAPOP 
project at Vanderbilt University with selection within strata by weighted sampling with 
replacement. The matched cases were weighted to the sampling frame using propensity 
scores. The matched cases and the frame were combined and a logistic regression was 
estimated for inclusion in the frame. The propensity score function included age, gender, 
region, years of education, and frequency of internet usage. The propensity scores were 
grouped into deciles of the estimated propensity score in the frame and post-stratified 
according to these deciles. The final weights were post-stratified to match the distribution of 
the sampling frame on three-category age, gender, and three-category education indicators. 
We acknowledge the potential biases this sampling approach engenders (particularly in view 
of incomplete internet penetration in Brazil). However, it is widely acknowledged in current 
survey research that this approach provides samples and survey data of at least equivalent 
quality, compared to traditional telephone or mail based recruitment into paper-and-pencil, 
telephone, or online-surveys with response rates that hardly ever get beyond 10 percent.  
 
Table SI-1 (SI-2) compares sociodemographic averages of our sample with the 
population of Brazil. For example, 48% of our sample finished education between 17 and 19 
years old. According to the Latinobarometer (2013) the median value of age respondents 
finished education is 17. We also obtained a gender ratio of 1:1, while the gender ratio in the 
overall population is 0.97:1 according to the 2015 population census. There are some 
differences in ideology but this is due to the recent political instability in Brazil. That said, 
“uncertain” individuals are the largest group in our sample and in the population. 
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SI-2 Socio demographic characteristics of our sample 
 
Table SI-1: Comparison of socio-demographic characteristics  
 Our sample Population Source of 
population data 
Ideology Left: 14% 
Center-left: 7.56% 
Center: 11.52% 
Center right: 5.32% 
Right: 8.76% 
Uncertain: 52.84% 
Left: 7.06% 
Center-left: 17.44% 
Center: 22.76% 
Center right: 15.78% 
Right: 5.15% 
Uncertain: 31.81% 
Latinobarometer 
2013 
Education The median value of age 
respondents finished 
education is 19 (48% of 
participants completed 
education between 17-19 
years old). 
The median value of age 
respondents finished 
education is 19 
Latinobarometer 
2013 
Income The average income is: R$ 
10,000.00 - R$ 20,000.00 
The 2014 Brazilian 
average household income 
was R$ 41,021.98 
The World Bank 
Gender 
(male: 
female 
ratio) 
1:1 0.97:1 (2015 est.) The World 
Factbook (CIA) 
Age The median value of age is 34  
 
The median value of age is 
31.1 (2015 est.) 
 
The World 
Factbook (CIA) 
Note: the table presents a comparison of the socio-demographic characteristics of our sample and the population of Brazil. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20	
	
SI-3 Item wordings of willingness to support climate policies 
Willingness to support climate policies 
Please tell us your opinion about the following statements: 
 
1. We need to preserve rainforests in Brazil even if this means 
less land for agriculture or construction in Brazil. 
 
 
 
 
3. 2. We need to preserve rainforests in Brazil, even if this means 
that the government of Brazil has to reduce government 
spending/investment in other areas. 
 
 
 
3. To limit climate change (global warming), do you think 
people in Brazil and other countries will have to change their 
lifestyles, for example by using less electricity and driving less; 
or can new technology solve the climate change problem 
without requiring changes of lifestyles? 
 
 
4. 4. Do you think climate change is harming people in Brazil 
now, will harm people in Brazil in the next few years, will not 
harm people in Brazil for many years, or will never harm 
people in Brazil? 
 
 
 
5. How concerned are you, if at all, that climate change will 
harm you personally at some point in your lifetime? 
 
 
 
 
6. The government of Brazil has pledged to reduce the 
country's emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2), which contribute 
to climate change (global warming), by a large amount (around 
40 percent). These reductions would take place over the next 
five to ten years. To that end, the government plans to conserve 
forests and reduce deforestation in Brazil and increase the 
amount of electricity from hydropower, solar, and wind.  To 
what extent do you personally support or oppose this policy? 
 
7. People hold different views on whether Brazil should 
increase its forest conservation efforts on its own, or do so only 
if richer (industrialized) countries provide financial assistance 
to Brazil for this purpose. Which of the following statements 
comes closest to your own personal point of view? Brazil 
should increase its forest conservation efforts . . . 
 
 
8. People hold different views on whether Brazil should reduce 
its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions on its own, or reduce its 
emissions only if other countries do the same and provide 
financial assistance to Brazil for this purpose. Which of the 
following statements comes closest to your own personal point 
 
 
1 Strongly agree 
2 Agree 
3 Disagree 
4 Strongly disagree 
 
 
1 Strongly agree 
2 Agree 
3 Disagree 
4 Strongly disagree 
 
1 Have to change lifestyles 
2 New technology can solve the 
problem without change of lifestyles 
3 Climate change is not a problem, 
neither change of lifestyle nor new 
technology are needed 
 
1 Now 
2 In the next few years:  
3 Not for many years:  
4 Never 
5 Climate change does not exist 
 
 
1 Very concerned 
2 Somewhat concerned:  
3 Not too concerned  
4 Not at all concerned 
5 Climate change does not exist 
 
1 Strongly support 
2 Support 
3 Oppose 
4 Strongly oppose 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Regardless of whether richer countries 
provide financial assistance to Brazil 
2 Only if industrialized countries (e.g. 
United States, Germany, Japan) provide 
financial assistance to Brazil 
3 Brazil should not increase its forest 
conservation efforts 
 
1 Regardless of what other countries 
do 
2 Only if industrialized countries (e.g. 
United States, Germany, Japan) 
reduce their own emissions as well 
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of view? Brazil should reduce its carbon dioxide emissions . . . 3 Only if industrialized countries 
reduce their own emissions as well 
and provide international funding and 
technical support to Brazil for this 
purpose 
4 Only if other lower income countries 
(e.g. China and India) reduce their 
own emissions as well 
5 Brazil should not reduce its carbon 
dioxide emissions. 
 
 
Figure SI-1 shows that concern about climate change and support for climate policy and 
forest conservation is indeed very strong, with support levels in the range of 70-90 percent. 
To the contrary Figure SI-2 shows that levels of willingness to support forest conservation are 
rather low. 
 
 
Figure SI-1 Willingness to support climate policy and forest conservation 
	  
Notes: For simplicity, the responses were recoded to a binary scale. The horizontal axis shows the percentage of respondents in the 
respective category (high support, low support). See SI-3 for detailed wordings. N=2,500. 
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SI-4 Item wordings of willingness to pay for forest conservation 
Willingness to pay for forest conservation in Brazil  
Please tell us whether you agree or disagree with the 
following statements: 
 
1. We need to preserve rainforests in Brazil, even if this 
means Raising taxes in Brazil to fund forest conservation. 
 
 
 
2. Would you personally be willing or not be willing to pay an 
additional R$ 30 in taxes per month over the next few years to 
enable Brazil to invest more in forest conservation? 
 
 
3. Would you personally be willing or not be willing to 
contribute R$ 100 to a large private environmental organization 
to support forest conservation in Brazil such as the Instituto de 
Pesquisas Ecológicas (IPÊ; this is an institute for 
environmental education and research that deals with 
deforestation issues in Brazil; more information is available at: 
www.ipe.org.br)? 
 
4. Would you personally be willing or not be willing to pay 
more for certain products related to forests, such as furniture or 
food, if this helped to protect forests in Brazil? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Strongly agree  
2 Agree  
3 Disagree  
4 Strongly disagree  
 
1 Would be willing 
2 Would not be willing 
 
 
 
1 Would be willing 
2 Would not be willing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Would be willing  
2 Would not be willing  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23	
	
 
Figure SI-2 Willingness to pay for forest conservation 
 
 
Notes: For simplicity, the responses were recoded to a binary scale. The horizontal axis shows the percentage of respondents in the 
respective category (high willingness to pay, low willingness to pay). The black bars are responses that indicate willingness to pay for 
climate policy; the grey bars show responses that indicate no willingness to pay (see SI-2 for detailed wordings). N=2,500. 
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SI-5 Item wordings of Control variables 
Items wording for control variables  
1. What is your gender? 
 
 
2. In what year were you born? 
 
 
5. 3. What is the highest education level you have completed? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Thinking about politics these days, how would you describe your 
own political viewpoint? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Thinking back over the last year, what was your household's annual 
income? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Male  
2 Female 
 
Select year 
 
 
1 No schooling 
2 Elementary school 
3 High school 
4 Professional 
training 
5 Undergraduate 
studies 
6 Professional 
diploma (5 or 6 years 
of studies) 
7 Postgraduate 
studies 
 
1 Left 
2 Center-left 
3 Center 
4 Center right 
5 Right 
6 Not sure 
 
 
1 Less than R$ 
10.000,00 
2 R$ 10.000,00 - R$ 
20.000,00 
3 R$ 20.001,00 - R$ 
30.000,00 
4 R$ 30.001,00 - R$ 
40.000,00 
5 R$ 40.001,00 - R$ 
50.000,00 
6 R$ 50.001,00 - R$ 
60.000,00 
7 R$ 60.001,00 - R$ 
70.000,00 
8 R$ 70.001,00 - R$ 
80.000,00 
9 R$ 80.001,00 - R$ 
90.000,00 
10 R$ 90.001,00 - R$ 
100.000,00 
11 R$ 100.001,00 - 
R$ 110.000,00 
12 R$ 110.001,00 - 
R$ 120.000,00 
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6. Could you tell us which of the following statements you consider 
correct? The "greenhouse effect", as debated in international 
negotiations on climate change, refers to: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. In your view is deforestation in Brazil, a... 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. I trust the federal government to do what is right 
13 R$ 120.001,00 - 
R$ 130.000,00 
14 R$ 130.001,00 - 
R$ 140.000,00 
15 R$ 140.001,00- 
R$ 150.000,00 
16 More than R$  
150.000,00 
 
1 Gases in the 
atmosphere that trap 
heat 
2 The Earth's 
protective ozone 
layer 
3 Pollution that 
causes acid rain 
4 How plants grow 
5 Don’t know 
 
1 Very serious 
problem 
2 Somewhat serious 
problem 
3 Not too serious 
problem 
4 Not a problem 
 
1 Definitely true 
2 Somewhat true 
3 Somewhat false 
4 Definitely false 
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SI-6 Comparison between WTP and WTS	
  
Table SI-2 shows the results of the CFAs along with the eigenvalue for each composite 
measure. For the WTS variable, we constructed a battery item that consists of items referring 
not only to specific policies for forest conservation, but also to individuals’ concerns about 
climate change. The factor loadings in the confirmatory factor analysis are in the range from 
0.27 to 0.45. Only a single factor resulted in an eigenvalue greater than 1. For the WTP 
measure, we employed only those survey items that focus on people’s willingness to pay 
additional taxes for forest conservation and financial contributions to environmental NGOs. 
Our survey questionnaire has four related items that are all used for the construction of the 
WTP variable. The factor loadings in the confirmatory factor analysis range between 0.50 
and 0.64. We obtained one factor of eigenvalue larger than 1. 
 
Table SI-3 shows descriptive statistics for the measurement of WTS and WTP. The 
mean for WTP equals 0.80 and the mean for WTS is 0.40. The standard deviation is 0.14 and 
0.29 respectively. That is, the two measurements differ strongly both in means and in 
distributions.  
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Table SI-2 Results of confirmatory factor analysis 
Survey Item Willingness 
to support 
Willingness to pay 
1. Reduce CO2 emissions 
regardless other countries 
0.45  
2. Government pledge to 
reduce CO2 emissions 
0.40  
3. Climate change harms 
people in Brazil 
0.27  
4. Climate change harms you  0.37  
5. Change lifestyles to limit 
climate change 
6. Forest conservation 
without financial assistance 
0.43 
 
 
0.45 
 
7. To preserve rainforests the 
government of Brazil has to 
reduce government spending 
in other areas 
0.29  
8. Less land for agriculture 
or construction in Brazil 
0.36  
1.  Raise taxes to fund forest 
conservation 
                           
    0.57 
2. Pay additional R$30 in taxes 
for climate policies 
 0.64 
3. Pay R$100 to ENGO   0.50 
4. Pay more for forest products  0.51 
N 2,500 2,500 
Eigenvalue 1.17 1.25 
Notes: only a single factor resulted in an eigenvalue greater than 1 in all latent constructs. Employing polychoric correlations the 
results remain qualitatively the same. The eigenvalue for the significant factor is reported in the last row. For internal consistency, 
we calculated the alpha coefficient (Cronbach’s Alpha) that is 0.58 for WTS, and 0.67 for WTP (standardized items because they 
are not on the same scale). Cronbach’s Alpha suggests that the items for both measurements do not have a very high internal 
consistency, but still within the acceptable scale to produce robust results (see also Lance et al. 2006). 
	
Table SI-3: Descriptive statistics for WTS and WTP 
 Obs. Mean SD Min. Max. 
WTS 2,500 0.80 0.14 0 1 
WTP 2,500 0.44 0.29 0 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28	
	
Figure SI-3 shows the distributions of the two composite variables (i.e., WTS and WTP).  
 
Figure SI-3 Distribution of composite measures for WTS and WTP 
	  
Note: the composite measures were standardized to a 0 to1 scale. 
 
The purpose of our WTS measure is to generally grasp people’s support for climate 
change mitigation. That said, we also provide a model where the WTS items focus only on 
supporting forest conservation policy (i.e., reduce CO2 emissions regardless other countries; 
government pledge to reduce CO2 emissions; to preserve rainforests the government of 
Brazil has to reduce government spending in other areas; less land for agriculture or 
construction in Brazil). We re-estimated the regression model using the alternative WTS 
variable and the results remain qualitative the same for all the sociodemographic 
determinants (Table SI-4). We find, however, that age is not significantly related to WTS 
when focusing on domestic policies. As the only difference compared to our main results age 
is no longer significantly related to WTS when focusing on domestic policies. 
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Table SI-4 Determinants of WTS for forest conservation 
 Model 1 
 WTS 
Gender -0.00 
 (0.01) 
Age 0.01*** 
 (0.01) 
Education 0.02***  
 (0.01) 
Left 0.01*** 
 (0.00) 
Center -0.00 
 (0.00) 
Right -0.00 
 (0.00) 
Income  0.00  
 (0.00) 
Knowledge 0.02***  
 (0.01) 
Deforestation salience 0.08*** 
(0.01) 
Trust 0.01 
 (0.00) 
Constant 0.48*** 
 (0.02) 
Obs. 2500 
F-Test 0.00 
R2 0.11 
         Notes: OLS regression, standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,  
*** p < 0.01 
 
Kknowledgeable participants are more likely to distrust the government and, thus, less 
willing to pay for forest conservation. In order to examine whether our results are systematically 
biased by this, we offer two additional robustness checks. First, we consider a variable on 
individuals’ trust of climate scientists. When incorporating this item into our analysis, though, the 
results remain qualitatively the same; at the same time, it also shows that participants who trust 
climate scientists are more supportive of climate change mitigation and willing to pay. This may 
indicate that climate scientists are a “more trustworthy source of action” than the government of 
Brazil (Table SI-5). Second, we examined interaction effects of knowledge and trust to 
government across all green categories. To this end, if our results were affected by a systematic 
bias (i.e., that more knowledgeable people tend to distrust the government), the multiplicative term 
of the interaction should be statistically significantly signed. However, this is not the case as it 
shown in the Table SI-6. 
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Table SI-5 Determinants of WTP and WTS-robustness check 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 WTP WTS 
Gender 0.03** -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Age -0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Education 0.01*  0.02***  
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Left 0.06***  0.02** 
 (0.02) (0.00) 
Center 0.02  -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.00) 
Right -0.02  -0.00 
 (0.02) (0.00) 
Income -0.00    -0.00  
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Knowledge 0.00  0.02***  
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Deforestation salience 0.03***  
(0.01) 
0.07*** 
(0.01) 
Trust 0.04*** 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
Trust climate scientists 0.04*** 
(0.01)  
0.02*** 
(0.00) 
Constant 0.32*** 0.53*** 
 (0.05) (0.02) 
Obs. 2460 2460 
F-Test 0.00 0.00 
R2 0.05 0.12 
Notes: OLS regression, standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; the number of observations decreases because 
some participants skipped the trust to climate scientists question. 
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Table SI-6 Determinants of WTS and WTP profiles 
(Knowledge*Trust and Knowledge*Trust climate scientists) 
Dependent variable (2) 
Shallow green 
(3) 
Paradox green 
 
(4) 
Deep green 
Gender 0.04 
(0.12) 
 
0.27** 
(0.12) 
 
0.15 
(0.12) 
     Age 0.02*** 
(0.01) 
-0.02*** 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Education 0.13* 
(0.06) 
 
0.01 
(0.06) 
 
0.26*** 
(0.05) 
 Left 0.44** 
(0.18) 
 
0.34* 
(0.19) 
 
0.42** 
(0.17) 
 Center 0.02 
(0.15) 
 
0.24* 
(0.15) 
 
0.03 
(0.14) 
 Right -0.20 
(0.20) 
 
-0.19 
(0.22) 
 
-0.15 
(0.20) 
 Income 0.03 
(0.02) 
 
0.01 
(0.02) 
 
0.02 
(0.02) 
 Deforestation salience 0.66*** 
(0.14) 
 
0.13 
(0.10) 
 
0.99*** 
(0.16) 
 Knowledge 0.66* 
(0.33) 
0.21 
(0.35) 
0.17 
(0.31) 
Trust 0.03 
(0.10) 
0.30*** 
(0.09) 
0.15* 
(0.08) 
 
 
 
Knowledge*Trust -0.17 
(0.14) 
-0.08 
(0.13) 
0.01 
(0.12) 
Trust climate scientists 0.27** 
(0.10) 
0.22* 
(0.11) 
0.47*** 
(0.11) 
Knowledge*Trust climate 
scientists 
0.09 
(0.15) 
0.08 
(0.15) 
0.03 
(0.15) 
Constant -3.34*** -0.88*** -3.88*** 
 (0.58) (0.52) (0.62) 
Obs. 
 
   2460 
Pseudo Log Likelihood   -3228.19 
Prob> χ2    0.000 
Notes: Multinomial logit: standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Baseline category is Non 
green = 1; the number of observations decreases because some participants skipped the trust to climate scientists question. 
 
 
To further examine participants’ understanding of the two measurements we provide additional 
empirical analysis. We replace the dependent variable (WTP) by an item that captures the 
differences between the values of WTP and WTS. This variable measures whether individuals’ 
replies to WTP and WTS are identical (absolute difference = 0) or, if they differ, by how much 
WTP is off WTS and vice versa (e.g., the maximum absolute difference is 1, which stands for full 
willingness to pay, but no willingness to support (or the other way round)). This helps us examine 
the impact of the several socio-demographic characteristics on differences between WTP and 
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WTS. Unlike the previous models, the results show that gender has a significant negative impact 
on the differences between WTP and WTS. Older and center-leaning individuals show higher 
variance on WTS and WTP. Also, individuals who trust the government to do what is right show 
less variance between WTS and WTP. In summary, the analysis here reveals substantial 
differences in determinants across the difference between the two outcome measures of interest. 
Notably, gender, age, left and center political ideology, and trust impact on the difference between 
individuals’ WTS and WTP (Model 1 in Table SI-7 and Figure SI-4).  
Second, we also sought to extend our analysis and examine whether individuals did not 
understand the difference of WTS and WTP. Specifically, we now provide an additional analysis 
that examines whether participants were willing to pay for one, but not another policy (i.e., (1) 
would you personally be willing or not be willing to pay an additional R$ 30 in taxes per month 
[…] to invest more in forest conservation? And (2): would you personally be willing or not be 
willing to contribute R$ 100 to a large private environmental organization to support forest 
conservation […]). Using that information, we are able to approximate a two-stage process (i.e., 
“could you give an estimation of the monetary amount on yourself?” Then if people give a lower 
estimated amount than their estimated amount in questions in WTP, then we can sort of know that 
this is information gap and ignorance of cost that makes people respond differently”) as we 
constructed a variable that measures WTP for one but not the other policy. Based on the original 
WTP and WTS items, this variable receives a value of 1 if a respondent said they would support, 
but not pay for climate mitigation policies (or vice versa; a value of 0 is coded otherwise). We find 
that female participants are, on average, more associated with WTP inconsistency. Also, older 
participants are less consistent with their WTP behavior than younger people, while particularly 
educated individuals are willing to pay for one policy but not the other (Model 2 in Table SI-7).  
 In order to examine whether these results are driven by attitudes toward a specific actor 
(i.e., government (for taxes) or civil society (for the second question we use above) and to control 
for the different amounts of money in the two questions (i.e., R$ 30 vs. R$100), we also provide 
models focusing on (1) only WTP to ENGOs, but not the taxes and (2) WTP in taxes but not the 
R$100 to civil society (Model 3 and Model 4, respectively). Although gender is not a significant 
determinant for WTP only to ENGOs, we find that female participants are positively associated 
with WTP taxes. Older participants are not willing to pay only to ENGOs, but age is not a 
significant determinant of WTP taxes. Moreover, we find that education – again – is a positive and 
significant predictor in general.  
Figure SI-4 shows results of a more systematic comparison between WTS and WTP. 
It depicts the scatter plot of WTP and WTS and also indicates the linear fit of a simple OLS 
regression and a median spline to facilitate the interpretation of the directional relationship 
between the two measures. The left-hand side panel, in combination with additional test 
statistics, suggests that there is significant difference between the two measures. When we 
exclude potentially influential observations1, as shown in the right-hand side panel, there still 
is a significant difference between the measurements. Dropping outliers from the data 
decreases the variance of WTP and, hence, reduces the impact of influential observations on 
the relationship between the two variables.  
 
																																																						
1 We employed Cook's distance (or Cook's D) to measure the information of leverage and residual of 
the observation. Using the predict command with the cooksd option we created a new variable 
containing the values of Cook's D, the outliers.  The conventional cut-off point for outliers is 4/n, 
where n is the number of observations in the data set.  
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Figure SI-4. Relationship between WTP and WTS 
 
Note: The panel on the left shows the scatter plot of WTP and WTS and also indicates the linear fit of a simple 
OLS regression and a median spline (Model 1, Table 4). The panel on the right does the same, except that it 
excludes influential observations. The solid line shows the linear fit of an OLS regression. The dashed line 
shows the median spline. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
0.
0
1.
0
0.
5
0.0 0.40.2 1.00.80.6
WTS
W
TP
0.
0
1.
0
0.
5
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 1.00.8
WTS
W
TP
34	
	
Table SI-7 Determinants of WTP and WTS-robustness checks 
	
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Δ (WTP-WTS) WTP 
inconsistency 
WTP ENGOs WTP taxes 
Gender -0.03*** 0.20** 0.07 0.21** 
 (0.01) (0.09) (0.14) (0.11) 
Age 0.01*** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.01 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Education 0.01 0.15*** 0.15** 0.10** 
 (0.00) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) 
Left -0.03*  0.11  0.08  0.11  
 (0.01) (0.14) (0.20) (0.15) 
Center -0.02**  0.01  0.10  -0.04  
 (0.01) (0.11) (0.17) (0.13) 
Right 0.02  0.06  0.18  -0.04  
 (0.01) (0.16) (0.24) (0.20) 
Income -0.00   -0.01   0.01   -0.02  
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Knowledge 0.00  0.10 0.07  0.10  
 (0.00) (0.09) (0.14) (0.11) 
Deforestation 
salience 
-0.00  
(0.00) 
0.12 
(0.10) 
-0.09  
(0.13) 
0.24**  
(0.12) 
Trust -0.03***  
(0.00) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
-0.01  
(0.07) 
0.09  
(0.06) 
Constant 0.42*** -0.71*** -1.73** -2.89*** 
               (0.04) (0.40) (0.57) (0.48) 
Obs. 2500 2500 2500 2500 
F-Test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R2 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 
Pseudo Log 
Likelihood 
 45.24 33.07 22.25 
Prob> χ 2  0.02 0.02 0.01 
									Notes:	standard	errors	in	parentheses;	*	p	<	0.10,	**	p	<	0.05,	***	p	<	0.01;	model	1	is	based	on	OLS	regression;	Models	2-4	are	logit	models	due	to					
the	binary	nature	of	the	dependent	variable.	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35	
	
 
 
SI-7 Explanatory variables 
 
Figure SI-5 shows what are the mean values of each variable in our sample. For example, the 
mean value of income is 2.85 and the mean value of education is 3.4. At the same time we 
obtain only a mean value of 0.50 for knowledge about Greenhouse gas emissions (GHG). 
 
 
Figure SI-5: Means of explanatory variables across the sample N=2500 
 
 
Notes: Center is at 0; Colored lines pertain to mean values. Age is log transformed for facilitating reading. 
 
 
 Figure SI-6 shows what are the mean values of each variable in our sample for each of 
the four green categories (Non-green, shallow green, paradox green, and deep green). For 
example, the mean value of education for the deep green category is 3.64; the next category 
with the highest mean value is shallow green at 3.47, whilst paradox and non-green almost 
overlap at 3.31 and 3.35 respectively. The shallow green category is also the wealthiest 
category in our sample with very small difference from the other categories (non-green 2.63, 
paradox green 2.58, deep green 3.03) 
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4
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Figure SI-6: Mean values of explanatory variables over the green categories 
 
	 	
Notes: Center is at 0; Colored lines pertain to mean values. Age is log transformed for facilitating reading. 
 
 
SI-8 Green categories 
 
Table SI-8 provides basic information on the four groups. 
 
Table SI-8 Non-green, shallow green, paradox green, and deep green individuals 
Notes: N= 2,500; the four groups were created by splitting the sample at the median values of WTS and WTP. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gender
Age
Education
Left
Center
Right
Income
Knowledge
Issue salience
Trust
1
2
3
4
Non-green Shallow green Paradox green Deep green
  WTP  
  Low High 
WTS Low Non-green 31% 
(N=773) 
Paradox green 
20% 
(N=497) 
 High Shallow green 21% 
(N=532) 
Deep green 28% 
(N=698) 
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Figure SI-7 First Difference Estimates (Table 3 in the main text) 
		  
 
Notes: Simulated estimates are based on 1,000 draws from a multivariate normal distribution; horizontal lines indicate 90 percent confidence 
intervals; the vertical dashed line indicates a first difference effect of zero; effects are calculated while all other variables are held constant at 
their median.  
 
 
Figure SI-7 shows changes in the probability of an individual ending up in a given 
category when increasing the value on a given explanatory variable from its minimum to the 
maximum and holding all other variables constant at their medians. 
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SI-9 Significant Differences across categories 
 
Tables SI-9 and SI-10 report χ 2-test statistics and probabilities to assess whether the effects of the 
explanatory variables are identical across categories. To this end, Table SI-6 shows what are the 
indicators that delineate to what category each individual belongs to when comparing non-green 
vs. deep green. Comparing non green vs. deep green individuals we find that the significantly 
different indicators are education, left political ideology, deforestation salience, and trust in 
government. Hence, these factors determine whether an individual belongs to either the non-green 
or deep green category. Likewise, comparing deep green vs. shallow green, the significant 
indicators that distinguish between deep green and shallow green individuals are age, education, 
deforestation salience, and trust in government. 
	
Table SI-9:  Significant Differences across categories ((1) and (4)) of individuals’ climate 
related categories 
Non-green vs. deep green 
Coeff. for (1) – Coeff. for (4)=0 χ2 Prob > χ2 
 Gender 0.89 0.35 
 Age 1.35 0.25 
 Education 22.96 0.00 
 Left 7.55 0.00 
 Center 0.07 0.79 
 Right 0.24 0.63 
 Income 1.72 0.19 
 Knowledge 2.73 0.10 
 Deforestation salience 45.74 0.00 
 Trust 15.43 0.00 
Note: variables in bold letters indicate significant different coefficients. 
 
Table SI-10:  Significant Differences across categories ((4) and (2)) of individuals’ climate 
related categories 
Deep green vs. shallow green 
Coeff. for (4) – Coeff. for (2) =0 χ2 Prob > χ2 
 Gender 0.63 0.43 
 Age 23.20 0.00 
 Education 5.60 0.01 
 Left 0.00 0.95 
 Center 0.03 0.87 
 Right 0.09 0.76 
 Income 0.17 0.68 
 Knowledge 0.55 0.46 
 Deforestation salience 4.54 0.03 
 Trust 12.27 0.00 
Note: variables in bold letters indicate significant different coefficients. 
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